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PARIS HILTON AVOIDS GETTING SLAPPED: THE
APPLICATION OF CALIFORNIA'S ANTI-SLAPP STATUTE
TO A RIGHT OF PUBLICITY CLAIM IN
HILTON V. HALLMARK CARDS1

I.

INTRODUCTION

Anyone who watches television or reads the newspaper has
likely heard of Paris Hilton. 2 As a rich socialite who grew up living
in posh neighborhoods in both New York and California, she is described as "famous for being famous."3 With so many news and gossip stories about her, it would seem natural for her face and words
to appear in the media.4 Yet, when Hallmark Cards began selling a
birthday card with Hilton's face and her familiar catch phrase,
"That's Hot," Hilton brought a suit claiming that Hallmark misappropriated her right of publicity.5 Hallmark then countered with a
1. Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 580 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 2009), petition for reh'g
denied, 599 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2010).
2. See, e.g., Associated Press, ParisHilton GetsJail Term, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2007,
at All, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/05/us/05hilton.html? r=1
&scp=1&sq=Paris+Hilton+jail&st=nyt (explaining Hilton sent to jail for forty-five
days for driving with suspended license while on probation for alcohol-related
reckless driving); Lola Ogunnaike, Sex, Lawsuits and Celebrities Caught on Tape, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 19, 2006, at II, available at http://www.nytimes.com/20-06/03/19/
(disfashion/sundaystyles/19tapes.html?scp=l&sq=Paris+Hilton+sex+tape&st=nyt
cussing distribution of Hilton's sex tape with former boyfriend Rick Solomon);
Lindsay Barnett, More California Chihuahuasto be TransportedOut Of Statefor Adoption
in Response to Shelter Glug, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2009, available at http://atimes
blogs.latimes.com/unlea-shed/2009/12/more-california-chihuahuas-to-be-trans(quoting spokesported-out-of-state-for-adoption-in-response-to-shelter-glut.html
woman for San Francisco animal care and control department who refers to
increase in number of Chihuahuas at animal shelters as "Paris Hilton syndrome").
3. Scoreboard Media Group, Paris Hilton Rule: Famous For Being Famous,
SCOREBOARD MEDIA, Feb. 6, 2007, http://www.scoreboard-media.com/paris-hiltonrule/ (describing how to create successful marketing projects based on Paris
Hilton model); see also Biography for Paris Hilton, THE INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE,
http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0385296/bio (last visited Oct. 5, 2010) (describing life of Paris Hilton).
4. See, e.g., Matt McGee, Paris Hilton is Top Twitter Search Celebrity, SEARCHENGINE-LAND.com, April 8, 2009, http://searchengineland.com/paris-hilton-top-twit-

ter-search-celebrity-17256 (stating Paris Hilton is fourth most searched twitter
account overall and most-searched celebrity twitter account); Wendy Boswell, The
Top 25 Web Searches of the Decade, ABoUT.coM, http://websearch.about.com/od/enginesanddirectories/tp/top-web-searches-of-the-decade.02.htm (last visited Oct. 5,
2010) (naming Hilton as twenty-first most popular web search from 2000-2009).
5. See Hilton, 599 F.3d at 894 (affirming district court's denial of Hallmark's
special motion to strike pursuant to California's anti-SLAPP statute).

(289)
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special motion to strike pursuant to California's anti-SLAPP
statute.6
Since its inception in 1953, the right of publicity has expanded
dramatically.7 What began as the protection of a famous individual's economic interest in the use of one's image has ballooned
into a right that makes others liable for a product or service that
simply "evokes" the image of a famous individual.8 Such cases are
especially prevalent in the Ninth Circuit, which hears cases from
the Hollywood area. 9 Critics of the expanding right of publicity
have noted that it interferes with defendants' First Amendment protections obstructing their ability to express ideas using the image
or likeness of a famous individual.10
Just as right of publicity cases conflict with the First Amendment protections of the defendants, so-called Strategic Lawsuits
Against Public Participation ("SLAPP") aim to hinder the free expression of political views protected by the First Amendment."
6. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 1992) (declaring that "it is in the
public interest to encourage continued participation in matters of public significance, and that this participation should not be chilled through abuse of the judicial process").
7. See K.J. Greene, IntellectualProperty Expansion: The Good, the Bad, and the Right
of Publicity, 11 CHAP. L. REv. 521, 524 (2008) (explaining copyright, trademark and
patent protection have also all expanded through bothjudicial decisions and legislation). Greene explains that the scope of the right of publicity has expanded
most noticeably in terms of which indicia of identity can be protected. See id. at
527 (remarking that "[wlhile there is abundant scholarship critiquing the right of
publicity, there are few truly robust defenses of the doctrine or its theoretical
rationales").
8. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1398-99 (9th Cir.
1992) [hereinafter White I], petitionfor reh'g en banc denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir.
1993) (holding Vanna White had right of publicity claim against company that
created television commercial starring robot with blonde wig and pearls standing
in front of game board similar to that of Wheel of Fortune, even though neither
White's face nor voice were in commercial); see also, Wendt v. Host Int'l, 125 F.3d
806 (9th Cir. 1997) (recognizing actors' right of publicity in fictional characters
they represented on popular television show).
9. See White v. Samsung Elecs., 989 F.2d 1512, 1521 (9th Cir. 1993) [hereinafter White 11] (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (noting livelihood of "cultural icons" depends on Ninth Circuit's decisions).
10. See generally Erika Paulsrude, Note, Not the Last Dance:Astaire v. Best Films
& Video Corp. Proves CaliforniaRight of Publicity Statutes and the FirstAmendment Can
Co-Exist, 18 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 395 (1998) (analyzing Astaire v. Best Film & Video
Corp., 116 F.3d 1297 (9th Cir. 1997), where video clips of dancer Fred Astaire were
used in instructional dance video, and court concluded use of footage was entitled
to First Amendment protection because use was related to entertainment and education under the Fair Use exception); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the
Right of Publicity, 40 Hous. L. REv. 903 (2003) (discussing intersection of First
Amendment protection and right of publicity).
11. See Jeremiah A. Ho, I'll Huff and I'll Puff-But Then You'll Blow My Case
Away: Dealing with Dismissed and Bad-Faith Defendants Under California'sAnti-SLAPP
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Such cases have been overwhelming the court system in recent
years. 12 Many states, including California, have enacted anti-SLAPP
statutes to deter meritless claims that stifle First Amendment
rights.' 3 Unfortunately, while the anti-SLAPP statute is often invoked effectively in defamation and libel cases, California's antiSLAPP statute has proven ineffective in reducing the number of
right of publicity claims.14
Right of publicity cases are not the normal arena for antiSLAPP motions.1 5 Such cases do, however, share some of the characteristics of other SLAPP suits. 16 Most importantly, SLAPP suits
allow wealthy parties to prevent others from exercising their First
Amendment rights by filing expensive and time-consuming suits.1 7
For many who would like to express their opinions, it is easier to
simply refrain from expressing those opinions rather than to endure having a right of publicity case brought against them.18 But
courts should consider whether anti-SLAPP motions should apply
Statute, 30 WHITr. L. REV. 533, 534 (2009) ("Essentially, SLAPP actions are lawsuits
directed at private citizens, primarily as retaliation for some specific exercise of the
political process.").
12. See id. (noting that while SLAPP cases have been brought in courts for
centuries, only recently have they been characterized as such). "Although the legal taxonomy of SLAPP suits . . . has been relatively recent within the American
legal landscape, lawsuits that have attempted to interfere with the public's right to
petition have existed since the American Revolution.

. . ."

Id. (outlining recent

characterization of SLAPP suits).
13. See, e.g., Aiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-751- 12-752 (2006); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 10 §§ 8136-8138 (1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.1224 (LexisNexis 1998); 14 ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 556 (1995); NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 41.635 - 41.670 (1993);
N.Y. Civ. RiGHTs LAw §§ 70-a, 76-a (Consol. 1992); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 9-33-1 9-34
(1995); WASH. REv. CODE §§ 4.24.500-4.24.520 (1989). For a complete list of states
with current anti-SLAPP legislation and states with anti-SLAPP bills, see California
Anti-SLAPP Project, Other States: Statutes and Cases, http://www.casp.net/statutes/
menstate.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2010).
14. SeeJames E. Grossberg & Dee Lord, California'sAnti-SLAPP Statute, COMm.
LAw., Fall 1995, at 3 -4 (1995) ("[California's anti-SLAPP statute's] ultimate effectiveness may depend on the outcome of several key interpretive issues."). According to Grossberg & Lord, questions that are not directly answered by the statute
include: (1) who is protected?; (2) is all "public" speech covered?; and (3) how
high is the threshold for showing legal and factual validity? See id. at 4 (outlining
evolution of California's anti-SLAPP statute).
15. See id. (listing defamation, business torts and intentional infliction of emotional distress as "the typical SLAPP causes of action").
16. See id. (describing characteristic SLAPP suits).
17. See id. ("SLAPP plaintiffs usually seek astronomical damages as part of
their strategy of intimidation.").
18. See Kathryn W. Tate, Califomia'sAnti-SLAPP Legislation: A Summary of and
Commentary on Its Operation and Scope, 33 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 801, 804-05 (explaining
dilemma facing SLAPP suit defendants).
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to right of publicity claims.19 One of the hallmarks of a SIAPP suit
is that the plaintiff is not truly concerned with winning the case; he
or she simply wants to stop the defendant's actions immediately. 20
Celebrities filing right of publicity claims, on the other hand, do
want to win their case. 21 Although anti-S[APP statutes theoretically
should not apply to right of publicity cases because of their divergence from characteristic SLAPP suits, California's anti-SLAPP statute has been applied to right of publicity cases in a few instances. 22
As Hilton v. Hallmark illustrates, even when anti-SLAPP motions are
used they will not likely succeed in right of publicity cases.2 3 Instead, to limit the number of right of publicity cases, the right of
publicity doctrine itself needs to be changed. 24
This Note will examine the Ninth Circuit Court's application
of California's anti-SLAPP statute to the right of publicity cause of
action in Hilton v. Hallmark and the impact this decision will have
on right of publicity law.25 Section II discusses the facts of Hilton's
19. See Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 580 F.3d 874, 885 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding
no language in statute excluding right of publicity claims from applicability of California's anti-SLAPP statute).
20. See Tate, supra note 18, at 803-04 (2000) (describing purpose and resulting danger of S[APP suits); Grossberg, supra note 14, at 4 ("[T]ihe purpose is not
to win the lawsuit but to overwhelm the defendant with the inconvenience and
expense of litigation. ... Indeed, lack of merit is a hallmark of a SLAPP suit.. .
21. See Mark P. McKenna, The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition,
67 U. Pir. L. REv. 225, 251 (articulating use of Locke's labor theory tojustify right
of publicity based on individuals' moral claim to results of his labor and economic
incentive created by right to exclude others from such results). According toJohn
Locke, "every Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right
to but himself. The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say,
are properly his." JOHN LocKE, Two TRFATISES OF GOVERNMENT 288 (Peter Laslett
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690). Therefore, it is argued that individuals
have property interests in their personas that they have created and thus have the
right to exclude others from using their identity so that the economic value of
their identity does not decrease. See McKenna, supra, at 251 (noting Lockean theory of property). Another reason celebrities would want to win a right of publicity
case, is because everyone has a right to define themselves by associating themselves
with certain activities and objects. See id. (noting celebrity desire to win right of
publicity cases).
22. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 1992) (outlining applicability of
anti-SLAPP statute).
23. For a further discussion of the ineffectiveness of anti-SLAPP motions in
right of publicity cases, see infra notes 173-196 and accompanying text.
24. See Volokh, supra note 10, at 930 (expressing view that right of publicity
"hasn't yielded far enough" to First Amendment rights); but cf Paulsrude, supra
note 10, at 398 ("[Although seemingly inconsistent with the recent practice of the
Ninth Circuit, the Astaire decision appropriately resolved the conflict between the
right of publicity and the First Amendment. . . .").
25. For a further discussion of the application of California's anti-S[APP statute in Hilton v. Hallmark and the impact on right of publicity law, see infra notes
153-205 and accompanying text.
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case against Hallmark and the procedural history that brought the
case to the Ninth Circuit.26 Section III explains the evolution of
right of publicity law and the enactment of the anti-SLAPP statute
in California.2 7 Sections IV and V discuss the Ninth Circuit's analysis of the application of the anti-SLAPP special motion to strike to a
right of publicity claim.2 8 Finally, Section VI describes the likely
impact that Hilton v. Hallmark will have on right of publicity cases in
California.2 9
II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Paris Hilton, an heir to the Hilton Hotel empire, is known
mostly for her status as a socialite and for her infamous sex tape. 30
Hilton is also known for her catchphrase, "That's hot," which she
registered with the United States Patent and Trademark Office.3 1
In 2003, Hilton appeared on a reality television show, "The Simple
Life," in which she and her childhood best friend, Nicole Ritchie,
travel the country to perform jobs they are unaccustomed to; in one
episode, Hilton and Ritchie work in a Sonic Burger fast-food
restaurant.3 2
The conflict in this case revolved around a birthday card sold
by Hallmark Cards, a national retailer of greeting cards.3 3 The card
at issue contained a cartoon picture of a waitress on which Hilton's
head was super-imposed with the caption: "Paris's First Day as a
Waitress."3 4 In the picture, Hilton tells a customer, "Don't touch
that, it's hot."3 5 The customer responds by asking, "What's hot?" to
26. For a further discussion of the facts and procedural history of Hilton v.
Hallmark, see infra notes 30-43 and accompanying text.
27. For a further discussion of the background of California's right of publicity law and anti-SLAPP statute, see infra notes 44-152 and accompanying text.
28. For a further discussion of the court's analysis in Hilton v. Hallmark, see
infra notes 153-72 and accompanying text.
29. For a further discussion of the impact Hilton v. Hallmark will have on right
of publicity cases, see infra notes 196-205 and accompanying text.
30. See Biography for Paris Hilton, supra note 3 (detailing fame of Paris
Hilton). An intimate video of Hilton with her then-boyfriend, Rick Solomon, was
released over the internet in November 2003. SeeJimmy Greenfield, Sex Video FiasCOS,CHICAGO TRIBUNE, July 21, 2005, at 39 (discussing Hilton's sex video scandal).
31. See Hilton, 580 F.3d at 879 ("Hilton says, 'that's hot,' whenever she finds
something interesting or amusing").
32. See id. (describing episode titled "Sonic Burger Shenanigans").
33. See id. (defining issue of case as "whether California law allows a celebrity
to sue a greeting card company for using her image and catchphrase in a birthday
card without her permission").
34. See id. ("The picture depicts a cartoon waitress, complete with apron, serving a plate of food to a restaurant patron.").
35. See id. (describing birthday card at issue).
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which Hilton answers, "That's hot."3 6 The greeting on the inside of
the card says, "Have a smoking, hot birthday."3 7
When Hilton brought suit in the United States District Court
for the Central District of California, she alleged misappropriation
of publicity under California common law, false designation under
the Lanham Act and infringement of a federally registered trademark.38 The district court granted Hallmark's motion to dismiss
the trademark infringement claim under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b) (6),
but denied Hallmark's motions to dismiss the right of publicity
claim and the false designation claim.3 9 Hallmark also filed a motion to strike Hilton's right of publicity claim under California's
anti-SLAPP statute, which the district court also denied. 40 Hallmark
appealed the denial of both motions. 4 1 The Circuit Court for the
Central District of California denied Hallmark's special motion to
strike because Hallmark was not, as a matter of law, entitled to the
transformative use defense for the misappropriation of the right of
publicity claim. 42 Therefore, Hilton had "at least some probability
of prevailing on the merits before a trier of fact." 43
III.

BACKGROUND

Cases in which a defendant files an anti-SLAPP motion are
nothing new to the Ninth Circuit.4 4 Likewise, right of publicity
cases have become increasingly common, especially in the Ninth
Circuit where cases originating in Hollywood are heard.4 5 As these
two doctrines have developed and expanded, it was only a matter of
36. See id. (explaining caption on outside of birthday card).
37. See Hilton, 580 F.3d at 879. (describing greeting on inside of birthday
card).
38. See id. (setting forth Hilton's First Amendment claims).
39. See id. ("Hallmark filed a motion to dismiss each claim ... for failure to
state a claim on which relief could be granted.").
40. See id. at 880 (detailing district court's rulings).
41. See-id. (explaining district court "concluded that the defenses required a
more fact-intensive inquiry than is permissible at such stage of the case").
42. See id. at 891 (analyzing Hallmark's assertion that greeting card was
transformative).
43. Id.
44. See Jerome I. Braun, California'sAnti-SLAPP Remedy After Eleven Years, 34
McGEORGE L. REv. 731, 735-36 (2003) (outlining cases involving California's antiSLAPP statute).
45. See White, 989 F.2d at 1521 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) ("For better or
worse, we are the Court of Appeals for the Hollywood Circuit.").
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time before they would collide in a case where the boundaries of
First Amendment protections would be tested.4 6
A.

Right of Publicity

1. Emergence of right of publicity cause of action
The first case recognizing a right of publicity was Haelan Laboratories,Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.47 There, the plaintiff was a
manufacturer of chewing gum who entered into an exclusive licensing agreement with a baseball player to use his picture on the gum
packaging.4 8 Defendant was a rival company who induced the same
baseball player to license it the right to use his picture for its gum,
even though the baseball player had told the plaintiff company that
it had the exclusive right to use his picture. 49 The defendant argued that the only applicable cause of action would be the right of
privacy, but that a right of privacy was not assignable, implying that
the plaintiff had no property right in the baseball player's privacy.5 0
However, the court held that in addition to a right of privacy, individuals have a right of publicity whereby they can "grant the exclusive

privilege

of publishing

[their]

picture.

. . without an

accompanying transfer of a business or of anything else."5 ' As a
result, the exclusive grant for the use of the baseball player's picture to the plaintiff rendered the subsequent grant to defendant
void during the term of plaintiffs agreement with the baseball
player, and plaintiff thus had a valid claim against defendant.5 2
The court reasoned that celebrities have an interest in receiving
money for the use of their images in advertisements, and without
the exclusive right to control such use, the celebrities would be deprived of any economic benefit.5 3
46. See Paulsrude, supra note 10, at 397-98 (noting that broad interpretation
of right of publicity "may conflict with the First Amendment's core values, such as
fostering a marketplace of ideas where knowledge and truth can be freely disseminated"); see also Volokh, supra note 10, at 904 (asking, "When does the First
Amendment protect the speaker's right to engage in [expressive] speech, and
when may the right of publicity lawfully constrain speakers?").
47. See Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866,
868 (2d Cir. 1953) (recognizing individuals' "right of publicity" and coining the
term).
48. See id. at 867 (setting forth facts of case).
49. See id. (explaining legal issue of case).
50. See id. (stating that plaintiffs contract with baseball player simply released
plaintiffs liability for invading baseball player's right of privacy by using his
picture).
51. Id. at 868 (holding individuals have "right of publicity").
52. See id. at 869 (describing effects of court's holding).
53. See id. at 868 (explaining reasoning of court).
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Supreme Court's recognition of right of publicity

More than twenty years after the right of publicity was first recognized, the Supreme Court finally explicitly authorized states to
provide their citizens with the right of publicity.54 In Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., the plaintiff performed a "human
cannonball" act whereby he was shot from a cannon into a net in
front of spectators at a county fair.5 5 Although the plaintiff had
asked a reporter for the defendant broadcasting company not to
film the act, the reporter filmed the act.5 6 The defendant broadcasting company then aired the fifteen seconds of footage on the
news.5 7 When the plaintiff performer sued the defendant broadcasting company for "unlawful appropriation of plaintiffs professional property," the trial court granted the defendant's motion for
summaryjudgment.5 8 The court of appeals reversed, and the Ohio
Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had stated a cause of action
for a violation of his right of publicity.5 9 The court then found that,
although the defendant had violated the plaintiffs right of publicity, the First and Fourteenth Amendments immunized the defendant from liability because of the legitimate interest in reporting
the news.6 0
The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to resolve the
issue of whether the defendant was immunized from its violation of
plaintiFs state law right of publicity by virtue of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 6 1 The court began by criticizing the Ohio Supreme Court's reliance on Time Inc. v. Hill,62 which involved a right
of privacy action rather than a right of publicity action.6 3 The
54. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S 562, 577 (1977)
(holding Constitution does not prevent states from protecting individuals' right of
publicity). The situation in which there is "appropriation of the very activity by
which the entertainer acquired his reputation in the first place" is the "strongest
case for a 'right of publicity."' Id. at 576.
55. See id. at 563 (explaining facts of case).
56. See id. at 563-64 (describing source of legal issue).
57. See id. at 564 (pointing out actions of defendant that led to lawsuit).
58. Id.
59. See id. (noting appellate court's reversal of district court's ruling).
60. See id. at 565 ("A TV station has a privilege to report in its newscasts matters of legitimate public interest which would otherwise be protected by an individual's right of publicity, unless the actual intent of the TV station was to appropriate
the benefit of the publicity for some non-privileged private use, or unless the actual intent was to injure the individual." (citation omitted)).
61. See id. (noting reason for grant of writ of certiorari).
62. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
63. See Zacchini 433 U.S. at 571-72 (discussing Ohio Supreme Court's reliance
on Time Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967)).
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Court explained that the right of privacy and the right of publicity
are grounded on different rationales. 64 While the right of privacy
centers on the protection of individuals' reputation, the right of
publicity focuses on guaranteeing individuals the right to benefit
economically from their efforts. 65 Even though the clip that aired
on the news was only fifteen seconds in length, it showed plaintiffs
entire performance, and the Supreme Court explained that showing an entire performance decreases the economic value of the
act. 66 The Court concluded "the Constitution does not prevent
Ohio from . . . deciding to protect the entertainer's incentive in
order to encourage the production of this type of work."6 7
3. Furtherdevelopments
After the Supreme Court authorized states to offer protection
for the right of publicity, a profusion of cases in which celebrities
asked for such protection emerged.6 8 With many courts ruling in
favor of celebrities for a wide variety of claims, the scope of the
right of publicity began to expand.6 9 In Midler v. FordMotor Co., the
Ninth Circuit added "voice" to the list of celebrity attributes that are
protected by the right of publicity.7 0 In that case, Ford Motor Company ("Ford") hired one of Bette Midler's former backup singers to
imitate Midler's voice for one of its commercials.7 1 Ford and its
advertising agency asked the backup singer to perform one of Midler's famous songs and directed her to "sound as much as possible
like the Bette Midler record."7 2 The backup singer was successful,
64. See id. at 573 (noting State's interest in protecting citizens against infringements of their right of privacy differ from those of protecting citizens against infringements of their right of publicity).
65. See id. (comparing rationale for right of publicity to justifications for patent and copyright while comparing rationale for right of privacy to justifications
for emotional distress and defamation).
66. See id. at 575 ("If the public can see the act free on television, it will be less
willing to pay to see it at the fair.").
67. Id. at 577. The court noted that even though First and Fourteenth Amendment do not require privileging news reporters, Ohio can choose to add more
protection to news reporters. See id. (discussing increased protection for news
reporters).
68. See Greene, supranote 7, at 524 (remarking that right of publicity doctrine
has expanded greatly).
69. See id. at 527 (noting increasing variety of right of publicity claims)
70. 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding "when a distinctive voice of a
professional singer is widely known and is deliberately imitated in order to sell a
product, the sellers have appropriated what is not theirs and have committed a tort
in California").
71. See id. at 461 (explaining facts of case).
72. Id.
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and many people testified that they believed the voice singing the
song was Midler herself.7 3
When Midler sued Ford, the court found that there was no
copyright infringement because Ford had a license to use the copyrighted song, and that there was no unfair competition because
Midler does not perform in television commercials.7 4 The court
did, however, find that Midler had a proprietary interest in her
voice as an attribute of her identity, and that "to impersonate her
voice is to pirate her identity."7 5 The Ninth Circuit thus held that
Ford had misappropriated Midler's identity for the purpose of selling its product, therefore infringing Midler's right of publicity.7 6
More recently, the California Supreme Court set forth a balancing test in Comedy III Productions, Inc. v Gary Saderup, Inc. to
weigh First Amendment protections against the right of publicity,
and used the standard of whether "the work in question adds signifIcant creative elements so as to be transformed into something
more than a mere celebrity likeness or imitation."7 7 There, the
plaintiff was the registered owner of rights to The Three Stooges. 78
The defendant was an artist known for depicting celebrities in charcoal drawings, which were then used to make lithographic prints on
T-shirts.7 9 While noting that images of celebrities are "important
expressive and communicative resources" for the public, the court
explained that "depictions of celebrities amounting to little more
than the appropriation of the celebrity's economic value are not
protected expressions under the First Amendment."8 0 Drawing
from the realm of copyright law, which shares the justification of
protecting "creative fruits of intellectual and artistic labor" with the
right of publicity, the Court stated that to be entitled to First
73. See id. at 462 (stating backup singer and Midler were both told by numerous people that song sounded as though Midler was singing it).
74. See id. ("Midler does not seek damages for Ford's use of 'Do You Want to
Dance,' and thus her claim is not preempted by federal copyright law... A voice is
not copyrightable. The sounds are not 'fixed."').
75. Id. at 463 ("A voice is as distinctive and personal as a face.").
76. See id. at 463-64 (holding right of publicity applied to distinctive voice).
77. 21 P.3d 797, 799 (Cal. 2001). The court concluded that the defendant's
product contained no creative elements so the plaintiffs right of publicity prevails
over the defendant's First Amendment rights. See id. (ruling in favor of plaintiffs
right of publicity).
78. See id. at 800 (stating that The Three Stooges are deceased personalities
who once made up former comedy act).
79. See id. (stating defendant created drawings and was active participant in tshirt production).
80. Id. at 803, 805 (explaining court's rationale for recognizing right of
publicity).
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Amendment protections a work cannot be a mere "literal description or imitation of a celebrity."8 1 The artistic work must, said the
court, be transformative in some way.8 2
Similarly, in Guglielmi v. Spelling-GoldbergProductions, the defendant publishing company aired a movie on television which they
described as a "fictionalized version" of the life of the deceased silent motion-picture actor Rudolph Valentino.8 3 The plaintiff, who
was the nephew of Valentino, sued the defendant for infringement
of Valentino's right of publicity, seeking both damages and injunctive relief.84 Although Valentino's right of publicity was assignable
to his nephew and Valentino had a right of publicity in his name,
voice and likeness, the court ultimately held that the defendant did
not infringe upon Valentino's right of publicity because the film
was transformative. 85
In contrast, in Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., the
Ninth Circuit held that the use of a picture of a distinctive race car
in an advertisement for a tobacco product was an infringement of
the race car driver's right of publicity.8 6 Neither the race car
driver's picture nor his name were in the advertisement, but the
court held that the car was part of his identity since the car would
be recognized as his and associated with him.8 7
The Ninth Circuit summarized its right of publicity case law
when it stated that the right includes anything that "evokes" a celebrity's personality.88 As the apex of right of publicity in the Ninth
Circuit, White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc. held that a com81. Id. at 808 (explaining right of publicity shares with copyright law goal of
encouraging free expression and creativity by protecting results of one's efforts).
82. See id. (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579
(1994), which concluded fair use defense to copyright infringement requires new
work to be transformative, "altering the first with new expression, meaning or
message").
83. 603 P.2d 454, 455-56 (Cal. 1979). The court explained the conflict between actor's nephew and production company over film titled, "Legend of Valentino: A Romantic Fiction." See id. (detailing conflict over the film).
84. See id. at 456 (summarizing plaintiffs argument that defendant falsely depicted Valentino in fictional movie for profit, thereby appropriating Valentino's
identity).
85. See id. at 462 (explaining holding of case, in which California Supreme
Court affirmed trial court's dismissal of plaintiffs complaint).
86. 498 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1974). "[T] hese markings were not only peculiar to the plaintiffs cars but they caused some persons to think the car in question
was plaintiffs and to infer that the person driving the car was the plaintiff." Id.
87. See id. at 826-27 (explaining that while plaintiffs "likeness" is unrecognizable, plaintiff is still identifiable because of car's "distinctive decorations").
88. See White 1, 971 F.2d 1395, 1398-99 (9th Cir. 1992) (refusing to limit right
of publicity claims to only appropriation of "name or likeness").
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mercial for Samsung Electronics which featured a female robot in
front of a "Wheel of Fortune" board was sufficient for Vanna White
to claim infringement of her common law right of publicity. 9 The
court stated that limiting right of publicity claims to a defined list of
appropriations would "effectively eviscerate" the right because celebrities' identities can easily be appropriated through means other
than their name and likeness.9 0 As a result, celebrities are able to
sue a defendant who creates anything that merely "evokes" their
personality, greatly infringing on the defendant's First Amendment
rights to express oneself freely.9 1
B.

California's Anti-SLAPP Statute

1. Language of the statute
The California legislature was one of the first states to enact an
anti-S[APP statute in 1992.92 California Civil Procedure Code Section 425.16 provides that:
A cause of action against a person arising from any act of
that person in furtherance of the person's right of petition
or free speech under the United States Constitution in
connection with a public issue shall be subject to a special
motion to strike, unless the court determines that the
plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the
plaintiff will prevail on the claim.9 3
The stated purpose of the statute is "to encourage continued
participation in matters of public significance." 9 4 The legislature
was concerned with increasing numbers of suits brought for the
purpose of stifling the First Amendment rights of defendants.9 5 In
89. See id. at 1399 (holding district court erred in rejecting White's right of
publicity claim on summary judgment).
90. See id. ("Viewed separately, the individual aspects of the advertisement in
the present case say little. Viewed together, they leave little doubt about the celebrity the ad is meant to depict.").
91. See White II, 989 F.2d 1512, 1512 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting)
(disagreeing with majority's denial of rehearing en banc). "Instead of having an
exclusive right in her name, likeness, signature or voice, every famous person now
has an exclusive right to anything that reminds the viewer of her." Id.
92. See Braun, supra note 44, at 731 (2003) (describing progress of courts applying California's anti-SLAPP statute).
93. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(c) (1) (West 1992) (entitling successful defendant to recover attorney's fees and costs).
94. Id. (noting statute is to be construed broadly to meet its purposes).
95. See id. ("The Legislature finds and declares that there has been a disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the
constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of griev-
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particular, such suits aim to silence the political message of the defendants. 9 6 Some states' anti-SLAPP statutes specifically limit the
special motions to strike only to cases involving the right to petition
the government, not free speech in general.9 7
The anti-SLAPP statute provides a procedural mechanism for
defendants to halt discovery through a special motion to strike, thus
potentially saving the defendant the time and expense of full discovery.9 8 In other words, the defendant does not need to wait until
the summary judgment phase in order to dismiss the suit.9 9 The
statute also provides for a successful defendant to receive attorney's
fees and costs.' 0 0 An amendment in 1999 added that a plaintiff or
defendant could immediately appeal a decision to grant or deny
the special motion to strike. 0 1
ances."); see also Johnathan Segal, Anti-SLAPP Law Make Benefit For Glorious Entertainment Industry of America: Borat, Reality Bites, and the Construction of an AntiSLAPP Fence Around the First Amendment, 26 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 639, 644745
(2009) (outlining findings of Pring and Canan, scholars credited with identifying
problem of SLAPP suits and proposing procedural measure to remedy problem).
Pring and Canan explained that the major concern with SLAPP suits was that they
moved political disputes from "the public arena" and into "the less-appropriate
venue of the courthouse, with its attendant costs." Id.
96. See George W. Pring & Penelope Canan, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public
Participation ("SLAPPS"): An Introduction for Bench, Bar, and Bystanders, 12
BRIDGEPORT L. REv. 937, 946-47 (1992) (concluding four elements of SLAPP suit
are "1. A civil complaint or counterclaim, 2. Filed against nongovernmental individuals or organizations, 3. Because of their communications to a government
(government body, official, or the electorate), 4. On a substantive issue of some
public interest or concern").
97. See Tate, supranote 18, at 812 (noting California's anti-SLAPP statute goes
beyond scope of traditional anti-SLAPP statutes by protecting more than just petition-related speech). For example, Minnesota's anti-SLAPP statute protects "lawful
conduct or speech that is genuinely aimed in whole or in part at procuring
favorable government action." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 554.03 (West. Supp. 2000).
98. See Tate, supra note 18, at 801 (explaining benefits of anti-SLAPP statute).
The statute does, however, allow the court to decide that certain discovery be continued upon a showing of good cause. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 425.16(g).
99. See Tate, supra note 18, at 811 (describing how special motion to strike
"shifts the moment ofjudicial intervention back from the summary judgment state
to the motion to dismiss stage"). The statute specifies the time frame for filing a
special motion to strike as "within 60 days of the service of the complaint." See CAL.
Civ. PROC. CODE

§425.16.

100. See Tate, supra note 18, at 801 (referring to provision as deterrent to
bringing SLAPP suits). Section (c) (1) of California's anti-SLAPP statute provides
that "a prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney's fees and costs." CAL. Cv. PROC. CODE §425.16(c)(1).
The same section also provides, however, that "if the court finds that a special
motion to strike is frivolous or is solely intended to cause unnecessary delay, the
court shall award costs and reasonable attorney's fees to a plaintiff prevailing on
the motion." Id.
101. See Tate, supra note 18, at 808 (noting amendment was added to "further
the purpose of the anti-SLAPP statute") (internal quotations omitted).
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Common law in California

Over the years since California's anti-SLAPP statute was enacted and amended, the courts have been charged with interpreting the statute. 10 2 The California Court of Appeals in Wilcox v.
Superior Court ruled that the defendant-movant has the burden of
proof for showing that the anti-SLAPP statute applies.1 0 3 A showing
that the anti-SLAPP statute applies involves proving that the plaintiff's claim arose from defendant's act "in furtherance of [his or
her] right of petition or free speech . ..

in connection with a pub-

issue." 10 4

As a result, courts have had to interpret what "in conlic
nection with a public issue" means.1 0 5 The 1997 amendment
requiring the statute to be "broadly construed" allowed courts to
find that a wide variety of acts are conducted "in connection with a
public issue." 0 6
In addition to resolving issues regarding burdens of proof,
courts have had to define many of the terms found in the antiSLAPP statute.107 The courts have not, however, always agreed on
102. See Braun, supra note 44(explaining aspects of anti-SLAPP statute that
have and have not been definitively interpreted by courts).
103. 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 452 (Ct. App. 1994). The courtcalls this burden
"fair" because defendant-movant is party who benefits from special motion to
strike. See id. (discussing fairness of the motion).
104. CAL. Cv. PROC. CODE. § 425.16(b) (1); see also Matson v. Dvorak, 46 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 880, 885 (Ct. App. 1995) (defining "threshold requirement" as proving
"claims arose from an act in furtherance of . . free speech"). Subsection (e) of the
statute lists examples of what constitutes such an act:
(1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative,
executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized by law; (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative,
executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding authorized by
law; (3) any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to
the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest; (4) or any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in
connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE. § 425.16(e) (1992).
105. See Tate, supranote 18, at 820 (noting original fears that phrase would be
interpreted too narrowly).
106. See id. at 826 (summarizing cases where "public interest or public issue
factor" was met). For example, in Macias v. Hartwell, the California Court of Appeals concluded that the election of a union leader was a matter of public interest
because 10,000 union members would be affected. 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 222, 225 (Ct.
App. 1997). Similarly, in Ludwig v. Superior Court, the court concluded that the
development of a discount mall was a matter of public interest because it would
affect area traffic and the local environment. 43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 350, 355 (Ct. App.
1995).
107. See Braun, supra note 44, at 736 ("When the first cases interpreting the
remedy were decided . .. California courts needed to determine nearly every issue
as a matter of first impression.").
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how to define such terms.1 08 In Rivero v. American Federationof State,

County and Municipal Employees, the California appellate court set
forth three categories of public issues: (1) statements "concern[ing] a person or entity in the public eye"; (2) "conduct that
could directly affect a large number of people beyond the direct
participants"; (3) "or a topic of widespread public interest."10 9
Weinberg v. Feisel, on the other hand, sets forth a narrower test that
defines public issue by distinguishing between public and private
interests.1 10
One thing that has been definitively decided is that once the
defendant meets the burden of showing that the statement or conduct at issue was "in furtherance of [his or her] right of free speech
in connection with a public issue," the burden shifts to the plaintiff
to prove a probability that he or she will prevail on the merits of the
case.'1 1 If the plaintiff is able to prove that he or she is likely to
prevail on the merits, however, this finding is not admissible at any
other phase of the case.1 12
Other important interpretations of California's anti-SLAPP
statute have emerged from cases decided since the statute's enactment.1 1 3 In Equilon Enterprises,LLC v. Consumer Cause, Inc., the Cali108. See id. (noting appeals courts' differing interpretations concerning antiSLAPP issues but acknowledging authoritative resolution of most of these issues).
109. 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 81, 89-90 (Ct. App. 2003). The court held that "supervision of a staff of eight custodians by Rivero, an individual who had previously received no public attention or media coverage" was not a matter of public interest.
Id. Tthe court stressed that certain activity "below some threshold level of significance is not an issue of public interest, even though it implicates public policy." Id.
at 90. Public interest is not established merely because the public favors certain
statements or criticisms. See id. (defining public interest).
110. 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 385, 392 (Ct. App. 2003). While there is no "all-encompassing" definition of "public interest," cases have provided guidance. Id. The
guiding principles are:
First, "public interest" does not equate with mere curiosity. Second, a
matter of public interest should be something of concern to a substantial
number of people .

.

. Third, there should be some degree of closeness

between the challenged statements and the asserted public interest...
Fourth, the focus of the speaker's conduct should be the public interest
rather than a mere effort "to gather ammunition for another round of
[private] controversy". . . Finally.

.

. a person cannot turn otherwise pri-

vate information into a matter of public interest simply by communicating it to a large number of people.
Id. at 392-93 (internal citations omitted).
111. See Wilcox v. Super. Ct., 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 453 (Ct. App. 1994) (concluding legislature intended plaintiff's standard to be "reasonable probability").
112. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §435.16(b) (3) (West 1992) (explaining success
of plaintiff on special motion to strike also does not alter burden of proof during
trial).
113. See Braun, supra note 44, at 736-40 (articulating that preamble to antiSLAPP statute itself raised two questions for courts to answer).
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fornia Supreme Court ruled that a defendant filing a special
motion to strike is not required to show that the plaintiffs suit was
filed for a forbidden purpose. 1 14 In other words, the plaintiffs intent is irrelevant to a defendant's ability to bring a special motion to
strike.1 15
C.

California's Anti-SLAPP Statute in Right of Publicity Claims

While many defendants have filed special motions to strike
pursuant to California's anti-SLAPP statute, very few of these cases
have involved claims for misappropriation of right of publicity. 116
There have been no reported cases heard by the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals involving the application of California's antiSLAPP statute to right of publicity cases. One recent district court
case involving such a claim was Browne v. McCain, which involved
the 2008 Presidential Election.1 1 7 There, singer/songwriter Jackson Browne brought a suit against Senator John McCain, the Republican National Committee, and the Ohio Republican Party for
the use of his song "Running on Empty" in a commercial for Presidential candidate McCain.1 18 One of Browne's claims was for misappropriation of common law right of publicity. 1 9
Without explicitly discussing how California's anti-SLAPP statute applies to right of publicity claims, the District Court for the
Central District of California concluded that the Republican National Committee met its burden under the first prong of the antiSLAPP analysis because the 2008 presidential candidates were an
issue of public interest.12 0 Therefore, Browne's claim arose from a
protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute. 12 1 The court then
114. See Equilon Enters. LLC v. Consumer Cause, Inc., 124 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507,
514 (2002) (affirming grant of defendant's special motion to strike pursuant to
California's anti-S[APP statute).
115. See id. (noting statute's plain language does not require defendant to
"demonstrate that the plaintiff brought the cause of action complained of with the
intent of chilling the defendant's exercise of speech or petition rights").
116. See Grossberg, supra note 14, at 4 (listing defamation, business torts and
intentional infliction of emotional distress as "the typical SLAPP causes of action").
117. 611 F. Supp. 2d 1062, 1065 (C.D. Cal. 2009). The court denies the Republic National Convention's special motion to strike songwriter Browne's common law right of publicity claim. See id. (upholding right of publicity claim).
118. See id. (describing commercial endorsing candidate McCain which contains Browne's performance of his song playing in background).
119. See id. (listing Browne's other claims which were for copyright infringement, vicarious copyright infringement, and violation of Lanham Act for false association or endorsement).
120. See id. at 1068 (relying on statute's mandate that it be construed
broadly).
121. See id. (explaining court's reasoning).
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moved on to the second prong, where the plaintiff must show a
probability of success on the merits of the case. 122 Browne contended, and the court agreed, that he met his burden of proving
each element of misappropriation of the common law right of

publicity. 1 2 3
Although the court concluded that Browne had proven a
probability of success on the merits of his right of publicity claim,
the Republican National Committee asserted the affirmative defenses of "transformative use" and "public interest." 124 The court
explained that the Republican National Committee had the burden
to prove these affirmative defenses by showing that the evidence
bars liability as a matter of law. 125 For the public interest defense,
the court reasoned that although the 2008 Presidential Election was
a matter of public interest, the specific use of Browne's song was
not shown to be of public interest.12 6 For the transformative use
defense, the court reasoned that the portions of Browne's songs
used in the commercial were verbatim copies of his composition in
his voice and that the portions "were not altered in any way."127
Greenstein v. Greif Company is another case where a defendant in
a right of publicity case filed a special motion to strike.1 28 Although
this is a rare example where a defendant was successful in his antiSLAPP motion against a right of publicity claim, the case has not
been published and therefore offers no precedential value in the
122. See id. at 1069 (adopting "the more lenient meaning of 'possibility"'
which requires only that "plaintiff show a mere possibility of success on his claim").
123. See Browne, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 1070 (finding Republic National Committee used Browne's identity and appropriated his name or likeness to their advantage, without Browne's consent and with resulting injury). The resulting injury in
Browne was that the commercial "gave the false impression that [Browne] was associated with or endorsed Senator McCain's Presidential candidacy." Id.
124. See id. at 1071-73 (stating defendant has burden of proof for affirmative
defenses raised to challenge plaintiffs showing of probability of success on merits).
125. See id. (citing Overstock.com, Inc. v. Gradient Analytics, Inc., 61 Cal.
Rptr.3d 29, 38 (Ct. App. 2007)) (stating that "when analyzing a defendant's affirmative defenses on an Anti-SLAPP motion, in order to prevail, the defendant must
show that its evidence bars the plaintiffs claim as a matter of law.").
126. See id. (emphasizing commercial's commentary was targeted at Senator
McCain, not Browne or his music).
127. Id. at 1072 (citing Comedy III Prods., Inc., v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d
797, 808-09 (Cal. 2001)). "In the context of a right of publicity claim, a transformative use contemplates actual transformation of a celebrity's likeness so that it becomes the defendant's own expression." Id.
128. No. B200962, 2009 WL 117368 at *10 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 20, 2009). The
court affirms the grant of defendant's special motion to strike pursuant to California's anti-SLAPP statute. See id. (ruling on special motion to strike).
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California courts.129 The case involved a plaintiff who served as a
segment producer for an episode of a reality television show, which
detailed the daily life of rock musician Gene Simmons.1 30 While
the plaintiff originally planned on working only behind-the-scenes,
during filming of the show he "act[ed] as an escort for Simmons
and his entourage as they travelled from appearance to appearance,
resulting in numerous interactions between Simmons and [plaintiff] as the cameras were rolling."1 3 1 According to plaintiff, he
never signed a written release and was therefore entitled to compensation if he appeared in the final cut of the episode.1 3 2
When the episode aired, it included footage of plaintiff, who
did not receive any compensation for appearing in the show. 3 3
Plaintiff then filed suit against defendant alleging misappropriation
of his right of publicity.134 When defendant filed a special motion
to strike pursuant to California's anti-SLAPP statute, the district
court granted it.135 On appeal, the intermediate court agreed that
the television program was an issue of public interest because Simmons was a public figure, and plaintiff therefore "became involved
in an issue of public interest when he was filmed interacting with
Simmons" for an episode of the television program about the famous rock musician.1 3 6 The appellate court also agreed that plaintiff failed to prove a probability of success on his right of publicity
claims. The court found that plaintiff implicitly consented to appearing on the program by being present during filming while he
129. See CAL. RuLzs OF COURT, Rule 8.1115(a) (2010), available at http://
www.courtinfo.ca.gov/rules/index.cfm?title=eight&linkid=rule8_1115 ([A]an
opinion of a California Court of Appeal or superior court appellate division that is
not certified for publication or ordered published must not be cited or relied on
by a court or a party in any other action.").
130. See Greenstein,2009 WL 117368 at *1 (describing documentary-style television show titled "Gene Simmons Family Jewels", and particular episode titled
"Shrinkwrapped").
131. Id. Ironically, the plaintiff wore a microphone during filming and also
was in charge of holding up a sign that informed the public that if they did not
want to be filmed, they should "please stay behind the cameras." Id. at *2.
132. See id. (discussing factual dispute between plaintiff and producers who
stated they saw plaintiff sign written release).
133. See id. (stating producer asked plaintiff to sign release one year after filming, which plaintiff refused to do).
134. See id. (explaining plaintiff "asserted two causes of action for common
law misappropriation in violation of his right to privacy and statutory misappropriation in violation of [CAL. CIV, CODE § 3344]").
135. See Greenstein, 2009 WL 117368 at *2 (stating district court found television show "concerned an issue of public interest" and plaintiff "could not show a
probability of succeeding on his claims").
136. Id. at *6. Simmons was described as "the most visible performer in the
popular rock band, 'KISS.'" Id.
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displayed a sign which stated that to avoid consenting to filming,
individuals should stay behind the camera.1 37
Padilla v. MRA Holding, LLC is another example of the California anti-SLAPP statute's application in right of publicity claims, but
it is another unpublished case. 13 8 There, defendant's employee
videotaped plaintiff when she removed her bathing suit top while
on a boat in a public area of Lake Havasu, California.13 9 Defendant
then used video clips of plaintiff in one of its adult videos, which
40
was sold over the internet and through television commercials.1
After plaintiff sent defendant cease and desist letters, she filed suit
against the company alleging, among other things, misappropriation of common law right of publicity. 14 1 Defendant then filed a
special motion to strike pursuant to California's anti-SLAPP statute,
which the trial court denied. 14 2
In reviewing the district court's denial of the motion to strike,
the appellate court agreed that plaintiffs complaint did not arise
out of protected activity. 143 The court concluded that the topic of
the video, plaintiff removing her bathing suit top while on vacation,
was not a matter of public interest because plaintiff was not a person in the public eye, the topic did not affect a large number of
people and plaintiffs private vacation was not the topic of widespread public interest. 144 As a result, defendant failed to meet her
initial burden required for prevailing on a special motion to
strike. 145 There was, therefore, no need to inquire into whether
plaintiff had a probability of prevailing on the merits of the case,
and no authority to grant defendant's motion for attorney's fees. 146
137. See id. at *9 (emphasizing plaintiff knew he was on camera).
138. No. BI172540, 2004 WL 2988172 at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2004). The
court affirms the denial of defendant's special motion to strike pursuant to California's anti-SLAPP statute. See id. (finding no special motion to strike).
139. See id. (emphasizing plaintiff did not know she was being videotaped).
140. See id. (explaining "Girls Gone Wild" video which "depicts a variety of
young women exposing their buttocks and genitals in public places").
141. See id. (listing other claims which were for placement in false light and
unfair and fraudulent business practices).
142. See Padilla,No. B172540, 2004 WL 2988172 at *1 ("The trial court denied
the motions to strike, holding that section 425.16 was inapplicable.").
143. See id. at *2 (citing Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc., 29 Cal.
4th 53, 67 (2002)).
144. See id. at *3-6 (applying test set forth in Rivero v. Am. Fed'n of State,
County & Mun. Employees, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 81 (Ct. App. 2003).).
145. See id. (explaining rationale of court).
146. See id. (noting court also denied plaintiffs request for attorney's fees because there was no evidence defendant filed motion to strike frivolously).
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Most recently, in Stewart v. Rolling Stone LLC, a California court
of appeal issued an opinion reversing the trial court's denial of a
special motion to strike pursuant to California's anti-SLAPP statute. 147 In that case, an "indie rock" band brought a class action
lawsuit against the publisher of Rolling Stone Magazine and a tobacco company alleging both common law and statutory misappropriation of its right of publicity. 148 The issue arose out of a special,
foldout editorial section in Rolling Stone Magazine which was
flanked by advertisements for the cigarette company.1 4 9 The plaintiffs claimed that the placement of the editorial, which included
their band's name, in between advertisements for cigarettes was an
unauthorized use of their name or likeness to sell the cigarettes.15 0
In concluding that the editorial arose out of Rolling Stone Magazine's right of free speech, and that the plaintiffs had a likelihood
of succeeding on the merits of their case, the court recognized the
interplay between First Amendment rights and the right of publicity.15 1 Once again, however, the court never acknowledged that the
anti-SLAPP statute was not originally intended for use in a right of
publicity case.1 52

IV.

NARRATIVE ANALYSIS

As a threshold matter, the court in Hilton determined that as a
Federal Circuit court sitting in diversity, they were to apply California state law, which meant that California's anti-SLAPP statute applied. 155 In determining whether to grant or deny Hallmark's
147. 105 Cal. Rptr. 3d 98, 103-04 (agreeing with defendants that "plaintiffs
have failed to present evidence sufficient to establish that they have a probability of
prevailing on the merits" of case).
148. See id. at 106 (outlining plaintiffs causes of action).
149. See id. at 104-05 (describing layout of feature, titled "Indie Rock
Universe").
150. See id. at 106 ("[T]he gravamen of the complaint is that defendants and
R.J. Reynolds 'used the artist names of plaintiffs and the members of the Class
knowingly and deliberately for the commercial purpose of advertising Camel cigarettes' without their prior authorization").
151. See Stewart, 105 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 112 ("The First Amendment has been
invoked by media defendants in cases involving commercial misappropriation."
(emphasis omitted)).
152. See id. (outlining use of First Amendment as a defense in right of publicity cases, but never explicitly mentioning how anti-SLAPP statute applies to right of
publicity cases).
153. See Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 580 F.3d 874, 880 (9th Cir. 2009) (applying
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)). The court also analyzed their
ability to review the district court's denial of Hallmark's special motion to strike,
concluding that appellate courts have jurisdiction to review anti-SLAPP rulings
under the collateral order doctrine. See id. (asserting jurisdiction to review anti-

SLAPP rulings).
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special motion to strike, the court analyzed the case under the twoprong test. 154 First, the court must determine whether the defendant's act was "in furtherance of the person's right of petition or
free speech under the United States or California Constitution in
connection with a public issue."15 5 Here, the court noted that Hallmark's conduct fell into the fourth category of protected acts set
forth by the statute: "any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the constitutional right
of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest."15 6
This first prong contains two issues: first, whether the conduct
was "in furtherance of the exercise of ... free speech;" and second,
whether the conduct was "in connection with a public issue or an
issue of public interest."15 7 According to the court, if the defendant's activity is "communicative," it will suffice as furthering the
exercise of free speech.15 8 Therefore, Hallmark's greeting card,
which is meant to convey a message, "comfortably" constituted
"conduct in furtherance of the exercise of free speech."1 5 9
Approaching the question of whether there was a "public issue", Hilton argued that there was no "public issue" because a celebrity could not be "the subject of some defined debate."16 0 Case
law and the language of the statute itself, however, led the court to
interpret "public issue or issue of public interest" as "matters of
public importance or consequence." 16 1 The court then looked at
two California intermediate appellate court cases for their particu154. See id. at 882 ("[A]n anti-SLAPP motion requires the court to ask, first,
whether the suit arises from the defendant's protected conduct, and, second,
whether the plaintiff has shown a probability of success on the merits.").
155. CAL. Cv. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b) (1) (West 1992); see also Equilon Enters., LLC v. Consumer Cause Inc., 52 P.3d 685, 694 (Cal. 2002) (describing
"threshold showing" of defendant filing special motion to strike).
156. Hilton, 580 F.3d at 883. The court referred to CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 425.16(e) (4) as a "catch-all category." Id.
157. Id. at 883-85.
158. See id. at 884 (concluding California courts interpret "in furtherance of
free speech rights" broadly, if analyzing that language at all).
159. Id. at 885. The court refused to hold whether defendant must prove conduct constituted "speech" under First Amendment analysis, but concluded that if
defendant must, Hallmark would meet that burden here. See id. (analyzing defendant's conduct).
160. Id. at 885-86. "[T] he activity of the defendant need not involve questions
of civic concern; social or even low-brow topics may suffice."Id. The court emphasized that the anti-SLAPP statute can apply when both parties are private individuals. See id. at 885 (applying anti-SLAPP statute when parties are both private
individuals).
161. Hilton, 580 F.3d at 866 (citation omitted).
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lar tests regarding the public issue/public interest requirement.16 2
Using the test set forth in Rivero, the court found that the Hallmark
birthday card was "in connection with a public issue or an issue of
public interest" because Hilton was both "in the public eye" and "a
topic of widespread, public interest."1 63 Applying the narrower test
set forth in Weinberg, the court found that Hallmark's birthday card
would still have met the public interest requirement because
Hilton's career was a "concern to a substantial number of people,"
and because Hilton's image and catchphrase (the "asserted public
interest") were directly connected to the birthday card (the "challenged statement"). 164 Further, the details that Hallmark's card illustrated occurred in the public, specifically on Hilton's television
show. 165 The court thus concluded that Hilton's right of publicity
claim sprang from "conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the
constitutional right of . ..

free speech in connection with a public

issue or an issue of public interest."166
Since Hallmark met its threshold burden, the court's analysis
moved on to the second prong of the anti-SLAPP statute inquiry,
namely whether Hilton could prevail on the merits of her right of
publicity claim. 16 7 While Hallmark did not contest that Hilton
could meet each of the elements of a claim for misappropriation of
the common law right of publicity, it did claim the affirmative defenses of "transformative use" and "public interest."16 s In regards
to the "transformative use" defense, the court reasoned that Hallmark could only succeed in its special motion to strike if it was enti162. See id. (stating California intermediate appellate courts have developed
many tests to decide whether "public issue or issue of public interest" are involved
have emerged in California appellate courts).
163. Id. at 887 (citing CAL. Cv. PROC. CODE § 425.16(e)(4) (West 1992)).
The court noted that Hilton had recognized "that she [was] a 'public figure and a
subject of public interest,' with 'widespread public recognition.'" Id. at n.8. For a
further discussion of the test set forth in Rivero, see supranote 109, and accompanying text.
164. Hilton, 580 F.3d at 886-87. Because greeting card involved both public
activities and personages it met the public interest requirement. For a further discussion of the test set forth in Weinberg, see supra note 110 and accompanying text.
165. See Hilton, 580 F.3d at 887 (discussing Weinberg court's analysis).
166. Id. at 888 (citing CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 425.16(a), (e)(4)).
167. See id. at 888-89 (explaining plaintiffs burden, though existent, was not
high).
168. See id. at 889 (providing elements of misappropriation of right of publicity claim under California law are "(1) the defendant's use of the plaintiff's identity; (2) the appropriation of the plaintiffs name or likeness to defendant's
advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and (4) resulting injury") (citation omitted).
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tled to the defense as a matter of law.' 69 Comparing the facts here
to the facts in Comedy III, the court found that Hallmark's card was
not, as a matter of law, transformative since the depiction of Hilton
on the card was almost identical to how she was depicted on the
television show.170 In regards to the "public interest" defense, the
court quickly concluded that Hallmark was not entitled to the defense "because its birthday card does not publish or report informa-

tion."17 1 Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's denial of
Hallmark's special motion to strike and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.' 7 2
V.

CIUTIcAL ANALYSIS

Despite precedent declaring that California's anti-SLAPP statute is to be construed broadly, the Ninth Circuit dismissed Hallmark's motion to strike. 173 This holding is unexpected considering
that California's anti-SLAPP statute provides broader First Amendment protections than most other states' anti-SLAPP statutes.' 7 4
169. See id. at 890 (noting while Hallmark could raise defense, Hilton could
still defeat motion to strike by showing "minimal merit"). In applying the transformative use defense, the court discussed the case of Comedy III Prods., Inc. v.
Gary Saderup, Inc., where the California Supreme Court framed the issue as
"whether the celebrity likeness is one of the 'raw materials' from which an original
work is synthesized, or whether the depiction or imitation of the celebrity is the
very sum and substance of the work in question." 21 P.3d at 809. Because Comedy
III "envisioned the application of the defense as a question of fact," the court
stated that Hallmark was "only entitled to the defense as a matter of law if no trier
of fact could reasonably conclude that the card was not transformative." Hilton, 580
F.3d at 890.
170. See Hilton, 580 F.3d at 891 ("[I]t is clear that merely merchandising a
celebrity's image without that person's consent, the prevention of which is the core
of the right of publicity, does not amount to a transformative use."). The court
stated that the facts in Hilton resembled those in Comedy III, where the court concluded that a drawn image of The Three Stooges on a t-shirt was not transformative. See Comedy III, 21 P.3d 797 at 811 (describing artist's work as "literal,
conventional depictions of The Three Stooges").
171. Hilton, 580 F.3d at 893 (referencing Montana v. San Jose Mercury News,
Inc., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639, 640-41 (1995)). In Montana, the court noted that the
public interest defense "rests on the right of the public to know and the freedom
of the press to tell it . . . ." Id. (citation omitted).

172. See Hilton, 580 F.3d at 893 (affirming denial of Hallmark's motion to
strike, but dismissing appeal of denial of Hallmark's motion to dismiss misappropriation of publicity claims and Lanham Act claim).
173. See id. at 882-83 ("Because 'it is in the public interest to encourage continued participation in matters of public significance, and [because] this participation should not be chilled through abuse of the judicial process,' the anti-SLAPP
statute is to be construed broadly.") (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(a)
(West 1992)).
174. See London Wright-Pegs, The Media SLAPP Back: An Analysis of California's
Anti-SLAPP Statute and the Media Defendant, 16 U.C.L.A. ENT. L. REv. 323, 334
(2009) (placing California's Anti-SLAPP Statute in category with broadest protec-
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Unlike other states, whose anti-SLAPP statutes only cover the First
Amendment's right of petition, California's anti-SLAPP statute covers the First Amendment's right of free speech as well.175 The result here is based on the reality that a plaintiff in California is
almost always likely to succeed on the merits of the case.1 76 Indeed,
anti-SLAPP statutes were intended to prevent meritless claims; unfortunately, anti-SLAPP statutes will not be successful against right
of publicity claims because most right of publicity cases are not meritless.' 77 Despite finding that Hallmark's card was protected, the
court denied the special motion to strike because Hilton demonstrated a likelihood of succeeding on the merits of her right of publicity case. 1 78
A.

Should Anti-SIAPP Statutes Apply to Right
of Publicity Claims?

The first major question this case raises is whether anti-SLAPP
statutes should apply to right of publicity claims at all. 1 7 9 Plaintiffs

claiming a violation of their right of publicity surely stifle First
Amendment-protected free speech.18 0 But it is questionable
whether the legislature intended for the anti-SLAPP statute to be
tion of media's First Amendment rights); Tate, supra note 20, at 858-59 ("One
consequence of California's having such a broad statute is that any individual who
alleges libel, invasion of privacy, or intentional infliction of emotional distress
against a newspaper, publishing, or other media company can expect to be quickly
served with a special motion to strike. . ."); Braun, supra note 44, at 732 (describing
California's anti-SLAPP statute when it was enacted as "the most ambitious and farreaching of all the state anti-SLAPP laws").
175. See Wright-Pegs, supra note 175, at 334 (contrasting California's antiSLAPP statute with those of other states).
176. See Braun, supra note 44, at 759 (noting after first prong of anti-SLAPP
motion analysis met or conceded, "the matter will turn on points of substantive
law"); Greene, supra note 7, at 527 (explaining relationship between expansion of
right of publicity and intellectual property restriction).
177. See White l., 989 F.2d 1512, 1514 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski,J., dissenting)
(opining that right of publicity is now so broad that "it's now a tort for advertisers
to remind the public of a celebrity").
178. See Hilton, 580 F.3d at 891 (holding Hilton had "some probability of prevailing on merits").
179. See id. at 885 (finding language of California's anti-SLAPP statute does
not preclude its application to right of publicity claims); see also Segal, supra note
96, at 145 ("The scholars' original conception of what constituted a SLAPP suit ...
almost certainly did not include suits aimed at entertainment-oriented
expression.").
180. See Paulsrude, supra note 10, at 418 ("The expansion of the right of publicity has raised concerns that First Amendment values . . . are in jeopardy.");
Volokh, supranote 10, at 929 ("As a critic of the right of publicity, I wouldn't mind
seeing the right of publicity eviscerated. . . ).
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used in right of publicity cases.181 One could analogize the celebrities who bring right of publicity claims to the corporate giants who
file SLAPP suits, and the media often defending right of publicity
claims to the public interest groups trying to exercise their first
amendment rights. 182 It seems that right of publicity claims are
brought mostly to receive economic benefits from the use of the
plaintiffs image, rather than "to dissuade or punish the exercise of
First Amendment rights."1 83 Unlike a plaintiff in a SLAPP suit,
Hilton and other right of publicity plaintiffs aim to win the case. 184
The court only spends two sentences discussing whether right
of publicity claims fit into the scope of California's anti-SLAPP statute.18 5 It says that "the particular cause of action Hilton has
brought is irrelevant to [their] decision." 8 6 While categorical exclusions may be uncalled for, it does not seem as though the cause
of action should be "irrelevant."1 8 7 Indeed, the purpose of the statute is to prevent certain types of lawsuits, namely those "brought
primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of
freedom of speech and petition. . . "188 The language of the statute
itself, however, makes clear that even if anti-SLAPP motions theoretically should not be allowed in right of publicity claims, they are
allowed.' 8 9 This is because a right of publicity case will almost al181. See Segal, supra note 96, at 640-41 (noting California's anti-SLAPP statute
is used differently today than it was when originally conceived). While discussing
the case in which three young males sued the production company of the film,
"Borat," for using their appearance on-screen comments, Segal asked how it was
"that anti-SLAPP law - which was created to protect grassroots activists from the
litigious excesses of developers and corporations - ended up protecting a multinational media conglomerate from a couple of drunken fratboys in a motor home?"
Id. at 640.
182. See Wright-Pegs, supra note 175, at 334 (explaining how media defendants compare and contrast to public interest groups).
183. Lafayette Morehouse, Inc., v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d
46, 48 (Ct. App. 1995).

184. See Tate, supranote 18, at 803-04 (describing purpose and resulting danger of SLAPP suits).
185. See Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 580 F.3d 874, 885 (9th Cir. 2009) (looking
to little guidance given by California Supreme Court regarding "what constitutes
an issue of public interest"). Quoting Navellier v. Sletten, 52 P.3d 703 (Cal. 2002),
the court noted that "[n]othing in the statute itself categorically excludes any particular type of action from its operation." Id.
186. Hilton, 580 F.3d at 885. "Ordinary commercial causes of action like
breaches of contract or indeed misappropriation of publicity, can be 'strategic lawsuit[s] against public participation' as much as defamation can be." Id.
187. See Braun, supra note 45 (explaining there are certain causes of action to
which anti-SLAPP motions to strike usually apply).
188. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(a) (West 1992).
189. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §425.16(a) (noting legislature meant to construe SLAPP suits broadly).
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ways arise from an act "in furtherance of the person's. . . free

speech under the United States Constitution in connection with a
public issue."1 90 The only other cases applying California's antiSLAPP statute to right of publicity cases, Browne, Greenstein, Padilla
and Rolling Stone made no mention of whether anti-SLAPP motions
should apply to such cases. 19 1
B. Which Right of Publicity Defendants Can File
Anti-SLAPP Motions?
The second question raised by Hilton is: if California's antiSLAPP statute applies to right of publicity claims, can all defendants
in such cases file such a motion?19 2 Here, Hallmark is a company
trying to make money by selling greeting cards, not a small interest
group trying to petition the government to prevent a particular action they disagree with.19 3 While some argue that the media should
not be entitled to bring anti-SLAPP motions to strike because of
their power, it would seem illogical to prevent media holdings from
using anti-SLAPP statutes since much of society's public discourse
occurs through media outlets. 194 Such public discourse is exactly
what the anti-SLAPP statute was intended to protect.19 5 Views expressed through the entertainment media are protected just like
political speech, and such views are greatly discouraged by the
threat of expensive and time-consuming litigation by those who are
the subject of such views.' 9 6

190. Id.
191. For a further discussion of cases applying California's anti-SLAPP statute
to right of publicity cases, see supra notes 116-52 and accompanying text.
192. See Braun, supra note 45 (explaining one question that needs to be answered is which defendants can file special motion to strike pursuant to California's anti-SLAPP statute).
193. See Wright-Pegs, supra note 175, at 334-35 (describing paradigm case applying anti-SLAPP statute, involving large corporation filing SLAPP against public
interest group).
194. See id. at 339 (responding to argument against media entitlement to antiSLAPP statutes, namely "potential for media abuse"); Segal, supranote 96 (arguing
expansive application of anti-SLAPP statutes is "appropriate" in light of "the contemporary media landscape and the United States' broad conception of the First
Amendment").
195. See Tate, supra note 18 (explaining purpose of anti-SLAPP statute).
196. See Segal, supra note 96, at 646 ("[L]ike the danger posed to government
petitioners, there is also the possibility that the threat of a suit could chill certain
kinds of entertainment-oriented expression, making it less likely that producers
will make biopics or features that intersect with reality").
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IMPACT

Because California is one of the states with the highest number
of right of publicity actions, Hilton v. Hallmark will have a large impact on right of publicity claims in the Ninth Circuit, as well as in
other jurisdictions. 197 As a result of its expertise on right of publicity cases, other circuits look to the Ninth Circuit as an authority on
such cases. 19 8 Hilton severs as the first Ninth Circuit case applying
the California anti-SLAPP statute to a right of publicity case. 199
Therefore, Hilton will likely be relied upon as precedent by other
courts and states when they experience the intersection of the right
of publicity and their version of an anti-SLAPP statute. It has become clear that the right of publicity framework needs to be refined in order to prevent further impingement on defendants' First
Amendment rights.2 0 0 But it has also become clear, after Hilton,
that California's anti-SLAPP statute is not the cure for the right of
publicity doctrine's problems. 20 1
Although under California's version of an anti-SLAPP statute,
the defendant in a right of publicity case will be able to file a special
197. See White l, 989 F.2d 1512, (9th Cir. 1993) 1521 (KozinskiJ., dissenting)
(noting livelihood of "cultural icons" depends on Ninth Circuit's decisions); Anastasios Kaburakis, Davis A. Pierce, Olivia M. Fleming, Galen E. Clavio, Heather J.
Lawrence, & Dawn A. Dziuba, NCAA Student-Athletes' Rights of Publicity, EA Sports,
and the Video Game Industry: The Keller Forecast, 27 ENrT. & SPORTS LAw 1, 30 (2009)
("By far, the Ninth Circuit in California has heard the most rights of publicity
cases."); Steven C. Clay, Starstruck: The Overextension of Celebrity Publicity Rights in
State and Federal Courts, 79 MINN. L. REv. 485, 486 n.12 (1994) ("Because of the
enormous number of celebrities living and working in California, as well as the
sheer volume of entertainment produced within California, California publicity
law will have a great impact on the rights of artists, entertainers, and advertisers
everywhere.").
198. See P. Stephen Fardly, Feet of Clay: How the Right ofPublicity Exception Undermines Copyright Act Preemption, 12 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L. J. 443, 454 (2004) ("[A]
number of other jurisdictions have cited Ninth Circuit rulings as precedent for
allowing right of publicity claims."); Michael J. Albano, Nothing to 'Cheer' About: A
Callfor Reform of the Right of Publicity in Audiovisual Characters,90 GEO. L. J. 253, 258
(2001) ("As the jurisdictional home to Hollywood, the Ninth Circuit's decisions
within this field will not only establish precedent for the numerous cases arising
from the California courts, but this body of decisionmaking will also be persuasive
to other state and circuit courts.").
199. For a further discussion of cases involving anti-SLAPP motions to strike
in right of publicity cases, see supra notes 116-52 and accompanying text.
200. See Paulsrude, supra note 10, at 419 ("The existence of a First Amendment limitation on right of publicity claims is necessary to restrict monopolies celebrities and their heirs possess over the image of cultural icons, as well as to
maintain and encourage the democratic exchange of ideas."); Volokh, supra note
10, at 904-05 (opposing right of publicity in general and specifically cases that fall
outside the category of "core commercial advertising").
201. For a further discussion of the effectiveness of anti-SLAPP motions in
right of publicity cases, see infra notes 173-96 and accompanying text.
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motion to strike, he or she will likely fail. 2 0 2 This is because, as
White v. Samsung Electronics demonstrated, a plaintiffs right of publicity applies to anything that might "evoke" his or her personality,
and a plaintiff will thus have a likelihood of succeeding on the merits of his or her case. 203 The effect of the decision in Hilton is that
district courts in the Ninth Circuit, and other courts that follow
Ninth Circuit right of publicity precedent, will continue to allow
plaintiffs in right of publicity cases to interrupt the free expression
rights to which defendants are entitled under the Constitution. 204
Without any justification from the Ninth Circuit as to why the California anti-SLAPP statute can be used in a right of publicity case,
other states may rely upon Ninth Circuit precedent, using their own
anti-SLAPP statutes to decrease the number of right of publicity
cases, rather than remedying the true problem - a right of publicity
doctrine that has been expanded too far.2 05
Lindsay C. Hanifan*

202. For a further discussion of the shortfalls of anti-SLAPP motions in right
of publicity cases, see infra notes 173-96 and accompanying text.
203. See White 1, 971 F.2d 1395, 1398-99 (9th Cir. 1992) (denying summary
judgment in Vanna White's right of publicity claim against Samsung for misappropriation because commercial "evoked" her personality and generated issue of material fact).
204. See Volokh, supra note 10, at 924 ("The right of publicity .. diminishes
the range of artistic expression that people can view, as well as the range that they
can create."); see also Paulsrude, supra note 10, at 419 ("The Ninth Circuit has
certainly done its part in expanding [the right of publicity].").
205. See White 11, 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) ( Kozinski, J., dissenting)
(opining that California courts are overprotecting plaintiffs' right of publicity).
Judge Kozinski warned that:
Overprotecting intellectual property is as harmful as underprotecting it.
Creativity is impossible without a rich public domain. Nothing today,
likely nothing since we tamed fire, is genuinely new: Culture, like science
and technology, grows by accretion, each new creator building on the
works of those who came before. Overprotection stifles the very creative
forces it's supposed to nurture.
Id. (citations omitted).
* J.D. Candidate, May 2011, Villanova University School of Law; B.S. in Psychology, Dec 2007, magna cum laude, University of Richmond.
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